Technology provider · ICT due diligence
Confidential · For authorised financial institutions under NDA
ICT third-party diligence pack
Document ref. PERPER-ICT-DILIGENCE · Version 1.0 · July 2026
ICT and operational resilience — due diligence pack
This document describes ICT and operational-resilience controls operated by Perper for the merchant SDK portal (sdk.perper.net) and related application services. Perper acts as a technology provider. Regulated payment services are delivered only through an authorised payment institution or electronic-money institution. Perper itself is not licensed by the Central Bank of Montenegro (CBCG) as a payment institution or electronic-money institution. This pack supports institutional third-party ICT questionnaires; it is not a substitute for an independent audit, penetration-test report, or a CBCG licence application.
PDF export of this diligence pack for NDA exchange. Not a signed independent audit certificate.
1. ICT controls
The following responses describe controls in production on the merchant portal application layer. Supporting detail is also published at /docs/security.
- How are merchant sessions protected?
- Sessions use HttpOnly cookies. In production, cookie names use the __Host- prefix (Secure, Path=/, no Domain attribute). Access tokens are short-lived (approximately eight hours); optional persistent sessions last up to approximately thirty days. Session tokens are not accessible to client-side scripts via document.cookie.
- How is CSRF prevented on state-changing operations?
- All state-changing API operations enforce same-origin validation of the Origin and/or Referer headers before execution.
- How is brute-force authentication limited?
- Authentication endpoints apply rate limiting of five attempts per fifteen minutes, with temporary lockout, covering login, PIN verification and secret-reveal flows.
- Do failed logins disclose whether an account exists?
- No. Authentication failure messages are identical for unknown users and incorrect credentials (anti-enumeration).
- What authentication audit evidence is retained?
- Structured authentication audit events are written to application logs (event type, timestamp, source IP, subject identifier). Passwords, PINs and tokens are never logged. Logs are suitable for SIEM ingestion by the contracting institution.
- Which HTTP security headers are applied?
- Content-Security-Policy (CSP), HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS), Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy (COOP), Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy (CORP) and related browser security headers are applied at the application edge. CSP currently permits limited inline script pending a nonce-based policy hardening.
- How are merchant payment notifications authenticated?
- Payment webhooks are authenticated with an HS256 JWT keyed by the merchant project secret over opaque payment payloads. Merchant webhook endpoints must use public HTTPS. Verification guidance is documented at /docs/webhooks.
- How are live fiat payment operations controlled before an authorised partner is live?
- Live pay and withdrawal operations remain disabled until the authorised partner configuration is enabled and the partner’s legal name and CBCG register references are set. Pre-contractual disclosures and durable PDF payment confirmations are available to merchants and partners.
- How are integration secrets disclosed to merchants?
- Project secrets are revealed only through a short-lived Strict cookie (approximately five seconds) that cannot be read by JavaScript. Merchants are required to store secrets on their own servers only.
- How are complaints handled on the technology layer?
- A complaints channel at /complaints issues a case reference with target acknowledgement within one calendar day and a target final response within fifteen calendar days. Signed-in merchants can view their own cases. Email complaints@perper.net remains an additional intake channel. Where live regulated services are active, the authorised institution’s statutory complaint timelines take precedence.
- How does safeguarding / segregation of client funds work?
- Perper does not act as issuer or EMI and does not safeguard client funds in its own books. Safeguarding and segregation of client money remain with the authorised institution. Technology interfaces can forward settlement instructions to the partner’s core only when live partner fiat is enabled; application ledger balances on the technology stack are not treated as safeguarded funds. Daily reconciliation reporting is available to signed-in merchants for operational review.
- How is KYC / AML decisioning handled?
- Live pay and withdrawal on the portal are blocked until the user’s Contabo KYC status is validated. Identity document capture is performed in the consumer application. Approve, reject, request-more and AML case handling remain in the authorised institution’s control-panel processes. Automated sanctions and PEP screening beyond those processes is out of scope for the technology layer described here.
2. Sub-processors and hosting
The evaluation / demo environment runs on EU-based infrastructure providers. Production hosting and database providers are defined by agreement with the contracting client. The evaluation stack listed below is current at the date of this document. Application and ledger data stores are separate — they must not be treated as a single book of record.
Contabo (EU)
Application hosting (VPS) for sdk.perper.net and related application processes
Current evaluation environment. Production provider to be agreed with the client.
Neon (EU)
Managed PostgreSQL for control-panel / administration services (evaluation)
Separate from the Supabase-hosted database used by other API services. Final provider per client agreement.
Supabase (EU)
Managed PostgreSQL pooler for API services (evaluation)
Separate from the Neon control-panel database. Final provider per client agreement.
Transactional email
Outbound transactional messaging (when configured)
Vendor to be confirmed in the production agreement with the client before go-live.
3. Exit and portability
- Merchants can rotate or revoke project credentials in the portal; webhook destination URLs remain under merchant control.
- Transaction history can be exported as CSV from Payments; per-transaction PDF confirmations are available as a durable record.
- Ending a portal session (clearing cookies) terminates portal access and does not alter ledger balances held under the authorised institution’s arrangements.
- Retention and deletion of KYC artefacts and complaint records follow the partner’s processor instructions once a data-processing agreement is in force.
- On exit, Perper supports export of merchant configuration and available portal operational logs under the commercial agreement. Customer funds are never held by Perper as issuer.
4. Incident notification — target timelines
The following targets apply for institutional scoping and become contractual only under a signed master service agreement (MSA) or equivalent heads of terms.
| Stage | Target | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Acknowledge | Within 4 business hours of confirmed detection | Business hours Europe/Podgorica unless 24×7 coverage is contracted. |
| Investigate / contain | Initial containment update within 24 hours | Severity-driven; critical authentication or payment outages escalate immediately. |
| Notify partner contact | As soon as practicable after confirmation; critical within 24 hours | Regulatory notification duties to CBCG and customers remain with the authorised institution. |
| Post-incident summary | Within 10 business days of closure | Root cause, impact and remediation — under NDA. |
5. Known limitations and planned enhancements
- Distributed (multi-instance) rate limiting beyond the current application-process controls
- CSP nonce-based policy to remove remaining unsafe-inline allowances
- Hardware-backed WebAuthn / device trust (TOTP two-factor authentication is already available)
- OAuth-style refresh-token rotation for merchant integrations
- Partner-specific live core adapters beyond the configured partner integration endpoint
- Independent annual penetration-test report attached to this pack (available on request when commissioned)
Disclaimer
- This document is provided without prejudice and does not constitute legal advice or a representation that Perper holds CBCG PI/EMI authorisation.
- Controls described are those of the technology layer. Regulated payment services, safeguarding of users’ funds and AML/CFT decisioning remain with the authorised institution.
- Answers must be re-validated against the agreed production configuration at contract signature and after any material change.
Institutional contact
perpernetwork@gmail.com